Vedantasara-13.

3. THE JIVA AND SUPERIMPOSITION:


121. Thus has been shown, in general, the process of superimposition, which is the attributing of unreality to the real.

122. Now will be considered, in particular, how people variously superimpose on the innermost Self such ideas as “I am this,” “I am this,” etc.,

123. (Thus for example) an extremely deluded man speaks of his son as his own Self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “Verily the Self is born as the son,” owing also to the fact that one loves one’s son as one’s own Self, and further because of the experience that one feels oneself prosperous or ruined according as one’s son fares well or ill.

 124. One school of Charvakas, however, holds that this physical body is the Self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “Man is constituted of the essence of food” (Tait. Up. II-1-1), owing also to the fact that a man rushes out from a burning house even leaving behind his son, and further because of such experiences as. “I am stout,” “I am thin,” etc.,

 125. Another school of Charvakas speaks of the sense-organs as the Self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “The sense-organs went to their father, Prajapati, and said,” (Ch. Up. V-1-7), owing also to the fact that the movement of the body ceases when the organs cease to work, and further because of such experiences as, “I am blind of one eye,” “I am deaf,” etc.,

 126. Still another school of Charvakas holds that Prana or vital force is the Self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “Different from and more internal than this (the physical body) is the Self which consists of the vital force” (Tait. Up. II-2-1), owing also to the fact that with the cessation of the working of the vital force, the sense-organs cease to function; and because of such experiences as, “I am hungry,” “I am thirsty,” etc.,

 127. Yet another school of Charvakas holds that mind (Manas) is the Self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “Different from and more internal than this (which consists of the vital force) is the Self which consists of mind” (Tait. Up. II-3-1), owing also to the fact that the vital force etc., cease to work when the mind goes into deep sleep, and further because of such experience as, “I am considering the pros and cons,” etc.,

 128. As against this, the Buddhists say that the intellect is the Self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “Different from and more internal than this is the Self which consists of Consciousness” (Tait. Up. II-4-1), owing also to the fact that the instrument becomes powerless in the absence of the agent and from such experiences as, “I am the agent,” “I am the enjoyer,” etc.,

 129. The Prabhakaras and the Tarkikas on the other hand say that ignorance is the Self on account of such Sruti passages as, “Different from and more internal than this is the Self which consists of bliss” (Tait. Up. II-5-1), and owing also to the fact that during sound sleep the intellect etc., merge in ignorance, and further because of such experiences as, “I am ignorant,” “I am devoid of Knowledge,” etc.,

 130. The Bhattas on the contrary say that consciousness associated with ignorance is the self, on account of such Sruti passages as, “During dreamless sleep the Atman is undifferentiated consciousness and full of bliss” (Man. Up. 5), owing also to the fact that both consciousness and unconsciousness are present in a state of dreamless sleep and from such experience as, “I do not know myself,” etc.,

Continues..